This paper focuses on the largely unexamined phenomenon of the developing trans-national suburban area west of Szczecin. Sadly the local communities in this functionally connected area struggle with national planning policies that are unsuitable for the region. The paper examines the impact of those processes on the border region in general and on the localities in particular. The paper investigates the consequences for local narratives and the cohesive development of the Euroregion and what position Polish and German communities took to develop the region, even without the necessary planning support. The region has succeeded in establishing grass-roots planning mechanisms which have helped to create a metropolitan-region working from the bottom up.
Exploring Subbordia -the impact of suburbanisation in cross-border metropolitan regions.
The case study of Szczecin and its German hinterland
Prologue -the role of closed/open borders in transnational suburbanisation
When we talk nowadays about borders, the terms 'hard' or 'soft' are often used in the media not to describe the physical form of the divides, but the ability to cross them. This is mainly the case when the debate tackles migration or the state of the Irish Border after Brexit. However, scholars like P. Khanna recognise a striving towards a global renaissance based on connections, creating a 'Connectography' (Khanna 2016: xvi) . For this author connectivity has replaced spatial division as the new paradigm of global organisation, where interactions replace national borders. According to him it is a driver of a more complex world, challenging researchers to read beyond space (Khanna 2016: xvii) . However, while connectivity sets globalisation as the new baseline, it still implies the importance of the local (Khanna 2016: 375) .
In 2015 the EU celebrated the 25th anniversary of its Interreg programme. Interreg is designed to bring territories together by facilitating cross-border regional cooperation. One success story, the Öresund Metro project, was advertised with the slogan 'Connectivity' emphasising the cross-border metropolitan connection between Copenhagen and Malmö, as a clean, fast and reliable link for transnational commuters (European Commission 2015) .
The Öresund region is often referred to as a role model for trans-national metropolitan areas with a bi-national and cross-border suburbanisation (Schmidt 2005; Smas & Schmitt 2015: 158) . The border became less noticeable and the number of daily commuters increased.
In January 2016, the Swedish government reintroduced border controls due to the increasing numbers of refugees. The metro line was stopped at Copenhagen airport, suddenly delaying the commute by 30-60 minutes. The cross-border suburbia faced sudden dis-connectivity. While the Öresund Bridge was crossed by 12 Million rail passengers in 2014 (Øresundsbro Konsortiet 2015) and the border was perceived as an open gateway, the 168,000 refugees entering Sweden in 2015 produced a response that reminded the region that borders are a symbol of national sovereignty. L. O'Dowd (2002: 14) noted that borders have the function of symbols containing different relevance and values for regional and national identity. In this case the narrative of protection and dis-connectivity was emphasised at the national level, while connectivity had been valued by the regional and European level.
In the Öresund region the suburbanisation processes have increased in the last 15 years. Language, culture and socio-economic conditions are similar, and the Scandinavian cooperation is well established. With Interreg, border regions, traditionally located on the periphery of the nation state, are encouraged to cooperate with their trans-national neighbours to facilitate their internal development potential. Creating connectivity across the border is perceived by the nation state as a softening of the border. A striving towards dis-connecting regions can be perceived from a regional perspective as a hardening of the border.
Introduction -Borderlanders' perception of the border Scholars have traditionally underlined the special role and functions borders have for a state. Early notions by the German Geographers Karl Haushofer and Friedrich Ratzel identified borders as 'organs' which have to be kept 'strong' or 'healthy' to keep the state strong (Scott 2011: 125) .
Thus, borderlanders had to be kept loyal to the state, as influences of a neighbouring state might question their loyalty, leading to challenges to its borders. Those notions influenced scholars like Halford J. Mackinder and are echoed in the works of Samuel Huntington, who replaced nations by cultures. This approach favoured the ethnic homogenisation of states, as was prominently executed after the end of the WWII, creating new challenges for current border regions (Eberhardt 2011: 16) .
However, the notion of the state as an organ fighting its natural cause has lost relevance. Borders are nowadays understood as negotiated by social entities and result in a space for relations between two states (van Houtum & Eker 2015: 46) .
For O. Martinez, the functionality of border regions is dependent on the openness and interaction (connections) across the line. In his study on the US-Mexican border he detected that borderlanders have other experiences and different expectations of its status and openness than citizens in central regions. This can lead to a feeling of otherness and being 'left-behind' encouraging the formation of a regional identity. The more the border influences everyday reality, a feeling of otherness might turn into a sense of separateness -tipping the regional identity in the direction of a separate identity (Martinez 1994: 12) .
The solidity of regional identity depends on the function of the border. L. O'Dowd described borders as obstacles, bridges, filters, symbols and resources. The last two have a significant impact on the connectivity of a border region -resulting in a higher or lower endogenous regional development potential. Borders as symbols can prevent connectivity. Conflicts occur when national symbolism is in competition with altering regional discourse. The border as a resource supports connectivity across the divide. Locals are motivated to cross and interact -exploiting legal and illegal activities to make a living. Everyday interaction is lowering the symbolic value of the nation state and gives the border the role of a symbol of local identity (O'Dowd 2002: 27) .
Scholars like J.W. Scott (2016) and H. van Houtum (van Houtum & Eker 2015) underlined the potential of borders for the development of border regions, accentuating the importance of examining local perspectives on the everyday practices of bordering and ordering. Following this argument, border regions which have a high degree of connectivity benefit from the positive effects of the border on socio-economic development, while those that have a tendency towards dis-connectivity, suffer from the negative effects of the border.
The German-Polish border -a hard case for connectivity?
German and Poles have been neighbours for more than a thousand years, still the German-Polish border is usually referred to as the 'hardest' one in Europe. T. Lunden argued that the factors, which influence boundary behaviour are time, space, nature, technology, regulation, economy, language and culture. These factors determine for him the hardness or softness of a border (Lunden 2004) . The rivers Oder and Neisse form a natural borderline between the two states. Nowadays the border separates Germanic languages from Slavic. RomanCatholic Poland borders the Protestant/Atheist part of Germany. The biggest EU economy meets an aspiring transition state, still struggling to adapt its economy. Time has had a most important impact of the borderland, as the WWII and its aftermath make Poles sceptical and careful towards its bigger neighbour. The Oder-Neiße line was not accepted by West Germany at all. In the re-unified Germany, it took until 1991 to guarantee the border (Hinrichsen 2015: 498) . This scepticism had a big impact on local borderlanders and on the Polish national identity.
Secondly the border region witnessed forced population exchange. While the German population was sent westward, across the border, the eastern side was repopulated with 're-settlers' from its former eastern territories which Poland lost to the Soviet Union. The War led to a literal breakdown of relations. The border region was alienated, since no personal or institutional relations existed across the border (Besier 2012: 203) .
N. Neuwahl sets various key dichotomies of borders in Europe: hard and soft borders as one prominent feature, but also insiders and outsiders, internal and external policies, territorial confines and systemic openness. The reality at the EU's borders is not itself a simple matter of black-and-white. There is a diverse range of opportunities and impacts on the border regions -especially on those in transformation due to the eastward enlargement of the EU (Neuwahl 2005: 23) .
N. Neuwahl's dichotomies underline that borders are connected to inclusion and exclusion processes. Her understanding of 'hard' or 'soft' does not include a physical attribute but rather a process based on interaction and identity building, which has a direct impact on the borderlanders and their everyday life. Scholars like S. Perera (2007) or C. Brambilla (2015) coined the term borderscape to cover this. C. Brambilla summarises this as follows: '…borderscapes are linked to the urgency to find a new concept that can express the spatial and conceptual complexity of the border as a space that is not static but fluid and shifting; established and at the same time continuously traversed by a number of bodies, discourses, practices, and relationships that highlight endless definitions and shifts in definition between inside and outside, citizens and foreigners, hosts and guests across state, regional, racial, and other symbolic boundaries' (Brambilla 2015: 19) .
Borders become negotiable by those who use them. J.W. Scott (2016: 1) noted: 'With everyday "bordering and ordering" practices we create and recreate new social-cultural and economic divisions between states, nationally and in urban contexts. As such, it is the process of border-making which brings diverse types of borders within a single frame of analysis.'
In the context of the Polish-German border region the simple factor of the river as a natural border does not determine the interaction. Hardness or softness is determined by how the river is used and perceived by the local borderlanders. The linguistic border is not a line, Germans and Poles use each other's languages individually creating a specific linguistic landscape (Gorker 2006) . Even the narratives of history are differentiating, negotiated on different parts of the border. Recalling the factors T. Lunden introduced, it would be easy to claim that the border region is 'hard' or disconnected, and the border is understood as a national Symbol, posing an obstacle to a cohesive development but as argued by J.W. Scott (2016) , P. Khanna (2016) and C. Brambilla (2015) , the local is more relevant as the border is negotiated on an everyday basis, resulting in othering and inclusion narratives, creating a variety of connections and disconnections in an interactive borderscape. There is an economic gap on the border. The GDP/ head in Mecklenburg 2016 reached €24.000 and in Brandenburg €26,500, while Zachodniopomorskie reached €9,500 so not even half of hat amount. Still all regions are far below the national GDPs and are clearly situated in the economic periphery of their country. The German regions suffer population loss (2016: Uckermark -4.1%, Üker-Randow -2.1%). The Polish suburban area is undergoing increases in population (2016: Zachodniopomorskie +0.8%) and house prices due to the economic dynamism of Szczecin (EUROSTAT 2016) .
The asymmetry between both countries and regions is even more marked due to the history of the area. Following the concepts of O. Martinez and the double-symbolism of borders described by L. O'Dowd, it is necessary to analyse the regional discourses and their correspondence to national discourses. The interlinkage will help one to understand the attitudes towards their neighbours and towards their own state. As O. Martinez argued, gaps in the attitudes could be read as signs of a border identity, expressing a feeling of otherness or even separateness (Martinez 1994) . Such notions may be understood as an indicator of cohesive tendencies across the border, favouring connectivity over national discourses on isolation.
The Oder-Neisse-Line -a German-Polish lieu de mémoir? National discourses on the border
The Oder-Neisse line is the current state border between Germany and Poland. While the Allies had already discussed the new geographic layout of Poland at the Yalta conference in February 1945, the final line was drawn during the Potsdam conference in August 1945. The newly established western border of Poland put former German territories under 'Polish administration ' and resulted, until 1946 , in the allocation of the German population to Poland (Hinrichsen 2015: 497) . While Poland won new territories in the west, it lost huge parts of its former territory to the Soviet Union. As a result, Poles were expelled and were sent straight to the so called 'recovered territories' (Stokłosa 2012: 246) .
Polish national discourse had been under the influence of the Soviet Union and thus there was a taboo on discussing the lost territories in the east. The new border areas were perceived as a land of opportunity and a return to the Piast (the first Polish royal dynasty) Polish tradition (Grzechnik 2017: 6) . The national discourses were focused on increasing German-Polish antagonism, while reducing Russian-Polish. The resulting ethnic homogenisation is the source for the hard boundary seen nowadays (Grzechnik 2017: 7) .
West-and East Germany did not recognise the border and assumed the territories were temporarily under Polish administration. However, the GDR signed the Görlitz Treaty with Poland in July 1950. The Oder-Neiße Line was declared as the 'untouchable border of Peace and Friendship' between the two states (Hinrichsen 2015: 499) . The border remained closed with a strict visa regime and a taboo on mentioning the past. Poland declared the GDR as anti-fascist, concentrating on German-Polish antagonism towards the Federal Republic (Grzechnik 2017: 16) .
In West Germany, the border became associated with defection and repulsion. Consequently, the Federal Republic did not recognise the border and continued to claim the pre-1937 territories -an attitude backed by popular opinion. Even in 1965 28% of the West Germans believed, that the Eastern Territories will eventually return to Germany (Hinrichsen 2015: 499) . Relations started to unwind in 1970 when Willy Brandt de-facto accepted the border by signing the Warsaw contracts (Hinrichsen 2015: 503) .
Poland and the GDR agreed on a visa-free travel regime in 1972. For the first time people, could cross the rivers -exploiting the variety of goods in the GDR or the access to western literature and music in Poland. The discourses on their neighbours changed in the 1980s. When martial law was declared in Poland, the border became sealed again. The East German media declared the closed border as a protection of 'socialist achievements', while Wojciech Jaruzelski started to re-heat the PolishWest-German antagonism (Hinrichsen 2015: 504) . The Oder-Neisse-Border became for Poland a crucial national symbol, connected to fear of their Western neighbour.
With the fall of the Berlin Wall and German reunification, the Polish government urged recognition of the border. In Germany's political discourses, the border was already accepted as final -leaving a gap in the narratives, which further worried the Polish public. When in 1990 the agreement was signed, the border was finally freed from political super-charging (Hinrichsen 2015: 511) . The national discourses focused on cooperation and partnership. Germany included Poland into their special relationship with France and the Polish government perceived the cooperation as a motor for European Integration. Interaction across the border increased, especially after Poland joined the European Union in 2004 and Schengen Area in 2007 (Stokłosa 2012: 26) .
Nowadays the border has no specific role in the national discourses in both countries but is still a memorial place for both nations in the understanding of P. Nora (1997: 14) , constituting a part of the collective memory and identity. However, as stated by O. Martinez, the border can have a different symbolism for the nation state and the border region. Thus, it is important to analyse the construction of the local discourses in the research area.
From 'Straż nad Odrą' to 'Szczettinstan' -local discourses on the border
In the first weeks after the WWII the city of Stettin was in a situation of dualism. The German administration was still in charge of organising the daily life and German refugees were sent back to the city, while at the same time the first Polish institutions were being established (Aischmann 2012: 11) . The status of the city remained unclear until the beginning of 1946, when the city and its close suburbs had been incorporated into Poland. Polish discourses narrated the border as the first line of defense against a potentially aggressive Germany. The propaganda coined the term 'Straż nad Odrą' (Guard on the Oder) -while local Polish newspapers pictured the areas west of the border as threatening, and lawless places, dangerous for Poles (Aischmann 2012: 19) . Although the Polish population perceived the border as justified and deserved, there was a connotation of fear and a provisional nature connected to the anticipated anxiety of the return of the Germans (Hinrichsen 2015: 510) . This notion hindered any kind of regional identity being constructed. It was not until the 1970s that the local population felt stability and also started to mentally settle down (Kinder & Roos 2013: 4) . The atmosphere was accompanied by the Polish government, which secured the region (Hinrichsen 2015: 511) . Combined with the fact of there being few investments, an atmosphere of temporariness was supported together with a feeling of being left-behind (Balogh 2014: 29) .
The feeling of temporariness dominated the German side as well, as most of those expelled stayed there, hoping for a return. For the local population, the official administration and the local media, it was clear that Szczecin is part of Germany (Aischmann 2012: 26) .
The Görlitz Treaty changed the perceptions on the border only slightly. The border remained closed and there was no local interaction across it, unfortunately the state media described the Oder as an untouchable border of peace between two socialist brother states, securing prosperity for both (Aischmann 2012: 50) .
The abolishing of the visa regime in 1972 was recognised on both sides as a breath of fresh air, allowing each side to discover their neighbours for the first time. On a personal level the Poles started to use the new freedom for shopping. Consequently, the Germans came to perceive the Poles as competitors for the limited number of products available in a command economy (Aischmann 2012: 129) .
However, the number of cooperation agreements increased, resulting in a more pragmatic view of each other. While the Poles perceived the economic situation in the GDR as positive, the Germans appreciated the relative freedom in Poland. The local German authorities observed this attraction rather suspiciously and after the border was closed in 1980, played openly on anti-Polish resentments, condemning the 'Solidarność' movement. The interactions were put on hold.
In the wake of German reunification, the response in the border area was twofold -while Poles felt that the status of the border had become insecure, local authorities recognised the opportunities to be derived from neighbouring a strong economy in the European Community (Hinrichsen 2015: 511) .
The Germans were rather aware of the wealth gap and became afraid of border related crime -which until today has an exaggerated impact in their perception of their neighbour (Beurskens, Creutziger & Miggelbrink 2016: 182) .
The regime changes in both countries brought a period of renegotiation of the neighborhood. Poles started to work in Germany, while Germans went to Poland to do their shopping. The open border enabled the elimination of taboos. The citizens of Szczecin started to discover its German heritage, generating a stream of literature which contributed to a new regional identity, where the memory of the generation of the German grandparents is preserved by a Polish generation of grandchildren (Musekamp 2013: 357) .
The Germans crossed the border in the frame of 'Heimwehtourismus', a sentimental form of tourism searching for individual locations linked to their family heritage, to discover their roots and to reflect on the shared experience of being replaced by Poles (Marszolek 2014: 71) . Although negative resentment and the attacks of German Nazis on Poles regularly produced heat in the local media, the broad discourse went in favour of cooperation.
In this period Szczecin was striving towards defining its orientation. Euroregion Pomerania, established in Exploring Subbordia -the impact of suburbanisation in cross-border metropolitan regions.
The case study of Szczecin and its German hinterland 1995, provided a basis for institutionalised cooperation. With EU accession in 2004 and the Schengen Area in 2007, the border started to fade away in everyday life. For Szczecin, the question of its own development became crucial while in Szczecin's western hinterland, the communities in Germany started to realise the positive effects of the metropolitan area. Due to increasing house prices in Szczecin and its good infrastructure, a new transnational area of cohabitation developed on the German side. Poles moved into empty houses and apartments in German towns, commuting daily to work in Poland.
The new dwellers had been positively received by the communes, who had been faced with scenarios of shrinking and decline in an economically backward area, and this provided a thriving area of dynamic development (Barthel 2010; Lis 2013: 144) . H.-J. Bürkner (2015) notes the region as an example of a surprising change in regional socio-economic imbalances. From the mid-1990s until Poland's accession, the German and Polish parts of the border region experienced diverging economic and social development. On the German side, hopes for an economic upswing were kept up although unfortunately the rural area had hardly any prospects due to a massive decline in the economy and a lack of entrepreneurial initiative. While feelings of superiority over Poland prevailed, by 2004, a feeling of helplessness and fatalism spread among the locals. On the other side of the border, the Polish way of transformation, initiated by small-scale privatisation and the expansion of micro-economic activities, led to subsequent population growth in the suburbs, resulting in a housing shortage and infrastructural deficiencies. Political and everyday attitudes displayed pragmatism and optimism.
On the German side an increase in unoccupied houses, on the Polish side a massive demand, resulted in cross-border commuter settlements bringing new neighbours representing a different everyday culture: agile, optimistic, communicative, expecting further social advancement and having more purchasing power than their German neighbours. For H.-J. Bürkner (2015: 30) this development represents an unplanned type of bottom-up Europeanisation.
New forms of European identity are emerging in the area. K. Lis claims that the region will be turned into a laboratory for everyday life, language, education, work and leisure -providing a space for ideas on how the region can be moulded together (Lis 2013: 10-11) . This development is carried out by 'regional enthusiasts' from both countries, who support region building through various bottom-up interventions (Kinder & Roos 2013: 5) , helping to deconstruct the border and re-imagine a new transnational space. The idea was the concept of the Polish-German Transkultura Network which imagined a new transcultural space called Szczettinstan (Kinder & Roos 2013: 12) . These 'Grass-roots' narratives reflect the proximity of the border and its consequences for the everyday life of the people.
Szczecin as a motor of trans-regional connectivity -milestones of trans-border mobility in the region
The concept of the border region as a laboratory of ideas and as a common space of cohabitation promotes connectivity. However, connectivity requires connections and mobility. Thus, it is important to analyse the institutionalised cooperation in the region and if it is enabling mobility.
Although Szczecin was already integrated in Euroregion Pomerania and various cross-border projects had been deployed under the EU Interreg-Programme, the access to the Schengen Area in 2007 opened the border physically and mentally (Balogh 2014: 17) . Szczecin did not just reconnect with a lost hinterland but was faced with new suburbanisation processes across the border. The areas to the west of Szczecin are well connected with the city. A highway connects Szczecin with Berlin -two train lines offer two-hourly services to and from Szczecin. However, the German areas could not benefit from the metropolitan effects of Szczecin (Bürkner 2015: 33) .
The German regional plans on a national level failed to recognise the suburban potential of the area even as late as 2015. Instead the region had the status of a rural, declining region, with no development potential. In contrast the suburban towns became attractive for the Polish middle class. The pull factors, besides the cheaper housing costs, include the infrastructure, the existence of German-Polish institutions, higher living standards and the positive attitude of local institutions. In 2007 the Löcknitz Housing company started to provide services in Polish and the community of Gartz is carrying out an intensive search for Polish inhabitants. The motivation of the German communes is not just to gain new inhabitants or generate higher tax venue, but to secure their infrastructure (Bürkner 2015 33) . The new dynamics soon raised the question of how those processes can be integrated in spatial planning. The German communes faced ignorance from the responsible regional planning authorities in Schwerin and Potsdam, while the Polish communes were confronted with resistance from the Polish planning authorities. Therefore cooperation was initiated through personal contacts and funded by the cross-border funds and programmes of the EU. Those networks depended on individuals, providing a limited degree of sustainability. A first step towards institutionalising the 11 Martin Barthel, Ewelina Barthel Exploring Subbordia -the impact of suburbanisation in cross-border metropolitan regions. The case study of Szczecin and its German hinterland cross-border cooperation was undertaken by the establishment of the Euroregion. However, it includes parts of South Sweden and has a larger territory and wider focus than the conurbation around Szczecin (Balogh 2014: 30) .
While the Euroregion is a perfect body to intensify cross-border cooperation in general, it is too large by size and small by capacity to tackle the problems of an emerging trans-border urban area. With the revision of national planning policies and the urge to create metropolitan regions within the framework of European spatial planning, Szczecin went ahead and initiated the Association of the Szczecin Metropolitan Area (Stowarzyszenie Szczecinskiego Obszaru Metropolitarnego) together with the neighbouring Polish communes (Małachowski 2013: 203) in 2009. With the German communes not included, the Association primarily concentrated on the development of the public transport system but included the aim to rebuild transport connections across the border into Germany (Małachowski 2013: 210) .
The degree of interaction was too weak for some German communes. The town Gartz tried to become an associate member of the association but was denied the status due to legal problems. Subsequently, the GermanPolish development conceptual plan for the trans-border metropolitan region of Szczecin brought together the regional planning authorities from Germany (MecklenburgVorpommern and Brandenburg) with those from Poland (the Voivodeship and the city and powiat of Szczecin). They started to reply to the new 'subbordia' by creating common strategies towards the spatial integration of the region (MIR 2014: 141) . It was not pro-active, but rather a response to the initiatives from below.
The term 'Subbordia' combines the words suburbia and border. We use the term to describe transnational cross-border migration and commuting, centred on an urban core in the neighbouring country. Inhabitants live on the one side, where their families are based, and their children visit schools and kindergartens -while at the same time the earners commute for work, shopping and cultural events to the centre across the border. Those groups form a new transnational space of cohabitation, where crossing the border becomes a daily routine and connectivity a necessity. In the case study area those activities are almost exclusively performed by Poles (Jańczak 2017: 53) .
Löcknitz and Gartz -living in subbordia -two cases of connected transnational places
The cohesion policies of the European Union stimulated new flows in the remote border region, helping towns like Löcknitz and Gartz to gain a new development perspective (Jańczak 2017: 55) .
Löcknitz is 25 kilometres away from central Szczecin, situated in the east of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. It has a direct road and two-hourly direct train and bus connections, making the town ideal for commuters. In 2016 the town had 3200 inhabitants, of which 700 were Poles. The demographic is remarkable, since it is one of the few spots in Northeast Germany, in which the population is growing (Jańczak 2017: 54) . The town attracted Poles mainly due to the German-Polish gymnasium (high school) and the early promotion of flats to Poles. In 2011 the town opened, in cooperation with the neighbouring Polish town Police, a bilingual kindergarten for 270 children.
Löcknitz has the longest established Polish migrant community in the region and the administration regards the influx of new inhabitants and the proximity to Szczecin as an advantage. Due to the solid public transport connection and the availability of flats, the migration to Löcknitz does not just comprise the upper middle class, but also the lower middle class and workers (Jańczak 2017: 54) . However, the vacancy rate and availability of cheap apartments is slowly ending and has dropped due to Polish migrants from 12% to 1% (Jańczak 2017: 56) . The town is now in competition with other communes in attracting the Polish middle class. J. Jańczak (2017: 16) states: 'The creation of this new multicultural community is not smooth; problems result, including when some of the Polish inhabitants treat the German border towns as a suburb of Szczecin, having most of their everyday life activities on the Polish side. This results in social alienation and limited contact with the local German population.' These tensions are expressed in the success of the extreme right NPD, which won 13.9% of the votes at the 2013 local election, one of the highest results in Germany (Balogh 2013: 199) . H.-J. Bürkner (2015: 35) noted that the project was undermined by local media narratives, which described the mayor as oblivious to the situation and accused him of betraying his 'own' people.
Something of the reverse situation has arisen in Gartz, situated in the North-East of Brandenburg, 35 Kilometres from Szczecin. Gartz is not connected by public transport but rather by road. In 2016 the town had 2500 inhabitants, of which 250 are Poles. Since Gartz mostly consists of family houses, the town attracts the Polish upper middle class. The local government embraced the metropolisation process as an opportunity. The influx of new inhabitants stabilised the population and secured crucial infrastructure, like the kindergarten and school. Due to the process, the town could secure its status as a self-governing body (Tautz 2014: 63) . However, the town is still lacking institutions and services to support and attract the newcomers and the missing public transport link might be a threat for the town when young Polish Exploring Subbordia -the impact of suburbanisation in cross-border metropolitan regions.
The case study of Szczecin and its German hinterland families become older. In 2011 20% of the children in the German-Polish kindergarten had been Polish (Jańczak 2017: 56) . As the increasing engagement of Poles in local associations suggests a growing identification with Gartz, the striving to integrate into the trans-national metropolitan region is created by individual initiatives promoted by the mayor. The perception of the new subbordian reality is dependent on the individual support of the German institutions and how the de-bordering processes are translated into local narratives. While in Gartz the influx is understood as clutching at straws and an unforeseen opportunity, the perception in Löcknitz is more mixed. Here the nationalistic circles are acting to promote the concept of belonging and the fear of 'Polonisation', even though local companies and institutions accept the new reality and the local administration is aware of the development potential (NPD-Hochburg Löcknitz… 2011). The national symbolism of the border is preventing people committing fully to the fact that Löcknitz is already functional subbordia of Szczecin.
Conclusion -towards transnational metropolitan areas
The notion of dis-connectivity is a reality for certain milieux, however the bottom-up and top-down approaches validate the emergence of a new transnational space. Although utopian concepts like Szczettinstan are far from becoming reality, the cross-border region started to develop a common vision. The regional narratives are heading towards cooperation and connectivity -differing, especially on the Polish side, from current national discourses favouring isolation. This leaves the borderlanders with a notion of otherness. As G. Kimura (2015: 84) elaborated, there is a significant language barrier limiting the potential of cooperation. However, the linguistic landscape of the border towns is changing. Polish and German is spotted on billboards, road signs and shops, creating a landscape of multilingualism.
The open border is a resource for regional development, leading to a cohesive improvement of the region by turning the periphery into a trans-national metropolitan region. The notion of connectivity is supported by the trans-border migration of Poles, living a suburban lifestyle in another country, which is challenging cultural differences at local level and leading to a new form of undefined identity -where the border is the crucial everyday determinant. The hard border is significantly softened by the 'in-between spacers' or Grenzgänger, who are not constrained by borders (van Houtum & Eker 2015: 44) .
The Grenzgänger are underlining, as P. Khanna (2016: 20) notes: '(that)...connectivity, not sovereignty and borders, are the organizing principles of humanity in the 21st century... Connectivity has become the foundation for global society. ' While the connectivity in everyday life is part of the personal experiences of the Grenzgänger, the communes are promoting a bottom-up process to create a trans-border metropolitan region. This process for a long time faced either ignorance from the Germans or resistance from national policies on the Polish side. After all, the feeling of being left-behind brought the region together. While national policies favour dis-connectivity and national solutions, border regions highlight the positive role of open borders on regional cohesion and even more on revitalising the common European idea by a Europeanisation from below, not just at the PolishGerman border, but also in places where borders are perceived to be soft, like the Öresund region.
